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Plato's theory of mind 
SABINA LOVIBOND 
ï The psucheand its functions 
At the risk of pedantry, it had better be pointed out at once that the 
subject under discussion in this chapter will not be Plato's theory of mind. 
but of the thing designated by the Greek word which we translate as 'mind': 
the word psuchê (pi. psuchai), from which 'psychology' and its cognates are 
derived,1 This branch of Plato's thought has much to teach us about the 
formation of our own conceptual landscape. For it would hardly be an 
exaggeration to say that Plato invented the idea of 'mind' with which 
modern European languages operate, and that it is his writings which have 
made this idea available to the Western philosophical tradition. It is Plato. 
more than any other thinker, who is responsible for the pervasive intellec-
tualism ofthat tradition - for the entrenched tendency to posit 'mind' (or in 
certain contexts, 'soul') as a substantial component of our nature, and to 
revere this as our most precious possession. (A relative devaluation of the 
opposed term, 'body', follows automatically from this move.) 
Plato's invention was inspired by the life and teaching of Socrates - that 
shameless amateur who wrote nothing, but whom Plato recreated as a 
principal character in his dialogues. A central theoretical achievement of 
Socrates seems to have been the appropriation of the word psuchê for a new 
and original purpose. According to the Oxford editor of Plato, John Burnet 
(who based his assertion on 'what [he believed] to be a complete enume-
ration of all instances of [that word] in the extant Athenian literature of the 
fifth century'),2 there is hardly an instance of it right down to the close of the 
century in any other sense than its two traditional ones - these being (i) 
courage', 'high spirit', and (ii) the 'breath of life', i.e. the principle which 
makes the difference between a living body and a dead one. This latter 
1
 I must also mention that my discussion will concentrate mainly on the dialogues 
of Plato's middle period - the ones most widely read by students. 
1
 See Burnet I123]. section x. 
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principle bore little resemblance to what we call 'mind', since it was not 
thought of as the seat of consciousness, will or feeling; it was merely a sort of 
shadow or phantom of the dead person, which could appear to the living in 
their dreams. 
Socrates, evidently, had something else in view when he reproached the 
citizens of Athens with preferring material gain to the improvement of their 
psuchai (Apology (Apol.) 2ç>ei-2, 3ob2), and when he spoke of the psuchê as 
a component of the human being distinct from the body but susceptible, as 
the body is. to its own characteristic types of harm and benefit (Crito 4 ~/e). In 
utterances such as these he was giving expression to the thought that the 
body is not the real person and that true self-interest requires us to aim not at 
physical gratification as such, but at the well-being ofthat non-physical part 
with which our identity is most closely bound up. This thought emerges also 
in the statement that 'it is not living, but living well, that we should treat as 
supremely important ' (Crito 48b). Plato repeatedly emphasises the revol-
utionary nature of such a doctrine from the point of view of the ambitious 
and competitive culture to which Socrates addressed it: in the Gorgias, for 
instance (481c), he makes the cynical 'realist' Callicles protest that if 
Socrates is serious in arguing for the unconditional priority of spiritual 
claims over worldly ones, it will follow that life as we know it is topsy-turvy 
and that people are systematically doing the opposite of what they ought. In 
other words, Plato represents the Socratic injunction to 'take care of one's 
soul' as a thorough-going inversion of contemporary moral standards - a 
' transvaluation of values'. 
It may appear problematic to help ourselves to the term 'spiritual' before 
we have arrived at any positive account of what psuchê in the new, Socratic, 
sense was supposed to be. In fact, however, the most convenient way to gain 
insight into the nature of 'soul' or 'mind' in the writings of Plato is by 
considering the activity he attributes to it, and the pattern of conduct which he 
takes as his criterion of loyalty to the Socratic ideal (that is, of whether any 
given person really is devoted to the care of his or her 'soul'). These two lines 
of enquiry are very closely linked, since the ideal human life as Plato 
conceives of it is, precisely, a life in which the immaterial essence of human 
beings is able to express itself to the full and to satisfy its natural impulses; 
virtuous conduct, then, will be a sign that the psuchê is in a healthy 
condition and is engaged in unimpeded activity. 
Many people today presumably bring to their reading of Plato a concep-
tion of 'mind' informed by debates within analytical philosophy. For such 
readers, perhaps the most striking feature of Plato's doctrine will be his 
portrayal of psuchê as primarily an organ of desire or striving, and only 
secondarily (and consequentially) as the seat of our reasoning powers or of 
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our moral conscience. It is the effort to fulfil its various natural desires which 
constitutes the proper work of the psuchê, and which for that very reason 
constitutes human life - since the work of the psuchê is, in a word, to live 
(Republic i.(Rep.) 353d9) . ' 
The most general characterisation of the objects of desire of the psuchê 
would be in terms of the familiar 'trinity of values' recognised by idealist 
philosophy - the good, the true and the beautiful. Thus (i) Plato makes 
Socrates say that every psuchê pursues the good, or in other words that an 
intelligent being aims in all its actions at the realisation of some state of 
affairs which it believes to be desirable (Rep. v i . 5 0 5 d l ! ; cf. Meno 783b, 
Gorgias (Gorg.) 468ab. In the Meno and Gorgias, which are earlier, the 'good' 
in question is relative to the agent, but by the time he wrote the Republic 
Plato had come to think of it as an absolute value). It does not follow, 
however, that there are no bad actions, for finite human beings are always 
to some extent ignorant about the real nature of the good (whether in the 
relative or the absolute sense), and the more ignorant we are, the less 
successful we shall be in our pursuit of it. (This is the basis of the famous 
'Socratic paradox', according to which there is no such thing'as voluntary 
wrong-doing: see Protagoras (Prot. ) 3 5 7d, 3 5 8bc.) Plato, who has a very low 
opinion of the political culture of his age, holds that almost everyone is 
doomed to accept some spurious 'good' in place of the real thing, and so to 
forfeit the happiness towards which the psuchê naturally tends. Yet there is 
an underlying vein of optimism in this teaching, typical perhaps of all 
rationalist philosophies: conflict and enmity are not the deepest reality, 
since all intelligent life has a common goal - the enjoyment of the good - and 
therefore a common interest in learning what it is and how to reach it. 
(ii) The desire of the psuchê for truth or reality is less self-explanatory, but 
we can develop some sympathy for this aspect of Platonism by thinking 
about its origin in the mission of Socrates. One of the most striking features 
of Socrates' conversation, or 'dialectic', was its sheer intellectual destruc-
tiveness.4 His policy, as Plato has him provocatively point out at his trial 
(Apol. 2 i a ff.), was to put to the test those who claimed to possess any kind of 
knowledge (specifically, the practitioners of the various crafts or technai) by 
cross-questioning them and drawing them into self-contradiction on their 
own subject-matter; his unvarying success in doing this proves, he says, not 
that he himself possesses any positive knowledge but that no one is 
(genuinely) wise except God. Nevertheless, a survey of Plato's early 
' 'Again, what of living? Shall we not call that a function of the soul?' - 'Certainly' 
(malista. lit. 'most of all'), 
* 'Destructive' should not be taken to imply 'harmful', however: see .Meno 8408 
and context. 
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dialogues - those in which the personality of Socrates, and his peculiar 
philosophical method, are most in evidence - shows that the overall project 
of Socratic discussion was highly purposive and that the questions it 
addressed were directly motivated by Socrates' interest in the well-being of 
psuchal, both his own and his friends'. 
The standard Socratic question is about the essence of some moral quality 
or phenomenon. Socrates insists that before we can decide the truth of any 
proposition about courage, piety, friendship or personal merit in general, we 
need to be able to say what each of these things is in itself (see Meno 71b); and 
the expected reward for answering such questions correctly is that the 
answers will contribute to the formation of a body of moral theory, that is, a 
resource for dealing with the larger question of 'how to live' (see Gorg. 500c; 
Rep. 1.3 5 2d) as coherently and reliably as a technikos (expert) proceeds 
within his own field. Plato's early work introduces us, then, to the idea of a 
'moral science' which would be built up out of the vague, one-sided insights 
embodied in ordinary moral consciousness by subjecting these to criticism 
and purging them of their inconsistencies - the goal of the exercise at any 
given stage being to win through, by a process of trial and error, to a 
relatively stable definition of the concept under consideration. 
Now, one aspect of this quest for definitions which seems to have made a 
particularly strong appeal to Plato's imagination was the promise it held out 
of reducing something inherently unstable and multiple - in this case, the 
multiplicity of 'common-sense' or pre-reflective opinions about moral and 
political value - to the unity and stability of an abstract verbal formulation 
(e.g. 'Justice is . . . ' ) which would, ideally, be immune to revision because all 
possible objections or counter-examples would have been disposed of in the 
process of formulating it. It was this prospect, according to Aristotle 
(Metaphysics (Met.) A. 98 7a29ff.), which Plato brought into connection with 
a doctrine he had accepted in his youth from the Heraclitean philosopher 
Cratylus, namely that 'all sensible things are in a state of flux and there is no 
knowledge of them'. It followed from this doctrine that if human beings were 
able to attain to any knowledge at all, that knowledge must be of non-
sensible objects; and the unitary essences which Socrates had been trying to 
articulate suggested themselves to Plato, in retrospect, as candidates for this 
role. He came to think of 'justice in itself, 'beauty in itself, etc. as 
constituents of a realm of objects which would indeed be knowable because 
they would be co-ordinated not with sense-perception but with (pure) 
intellect. (The spatial metaphor of an intelligible realm is Plato's own: see 
Rep. vi.5ogd2.) 
In the great dialogues of Plato's middle period - the Phaedo, Symposium, 
Republic and Phaedrus - we find the opposition between 'sensible' and 
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'intelligible' worlds elaborated into the theory of Forms or Ideas which is the 
centre-piece of his philosophy. This theory is far from being simply a means 
of moral edification. It is a direct descendant of the Pythagorean view that 
what is most real in things is their form or structure (and not, as the Ionian 
thinkers had assumed, the matter of which they are made); and as such, it 
aspires to the status of a universal mode of explanation on a par with the 
mechanistic mode which was its rival in the philosophy of science (see 
Phaedo 9 7 b - i 0 2 a ) , Still, one of the most important applications Plato finds 
for his theory is in setting before us the vision of a way of life that would 
gratify intellectual desire. Just as Socrates conspicuously refused to accept the 
counterfeit 'goods' of popular esteem in place of the true good, so he refused 
to accept the counterfeit 'realities' of popular opinion in place of something 
that, by successfully withstanding criticism, would prove itself worthy to be 
called a representation of reality. Plato argues in the Republic that the 
ultimate winner of this title will be a completely unified body of theory of the 
form exemplified by the piecemeal achievements of dialectic: that is, an 
explicit 'account* (logos) of the being, or essence, of every possible object of 
thought and of its relation to every other such object (Rep. vii.5 34b; 5 370c), 
And he pictures the successful outcome of philosophical enquiry in terms of 
a union between the Forms and ' that part of the [enquirer's] psuchê which, 
being akin to such objects, is qualified to grasp them' (Rep. vi.49ob). This 
union' would have as its issue intelligence (nous) and truth (alêtheia), and it 
alone would summon our reasoning powers into full activity and make 
them 'really live and grow'. 
(iii) The third characteristic tendency of the Platonic psuchê is towards the 
beautiful (to kalon, also conventionally translated as 'the noble' or 'the fine') 
- although from the point of view of individual existence, this tendency is 
the one which declares itself first and which renders the other two 
intelligible. Plato thinks that Beauty is unique among the Forms in being 
manifest in our senses (Phaedrus 2 5od): that whereas other intelligible 
objects such as Justice, Temperance, etc. can be brought to articulate 
consciousness only through the exercise of our (never fully adequate) 
reasoning powers, there are certain encounters between an individual 
psuchê and an object occurring in everyday experience which sponta-
neously reveal to that psuchê the existence of an ideal world beyond the 
world of sense. The class of objects which possess this power of revelation are 
those we credit with the property of 'beauty', i.e. - roughly - with being such 
as to provoke desire or promise happiness. ' 
For Plato, then, the aptitude of the psuchê to be drawn towards some 
' Cf. Stendhal. De l'amour ( 1822), eh. ι y: 'Beauty is only the promise of happiness.' 
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congenial object outside itself is the starting-point and necessary condition 
of what he calls 'philosophy': Progress beyond the starting-point, however, 
calls for resolute non-acquiescence in the seeming impossibility, given the 
constraints of the human condition, of getting what we are really after in 
our capacity as desiring creatures. For the object of love or desire (eras) in 
general, we are told in the Symposium (Symp.) (260a), is the perpetual 
possession of the good; and perpetual enjoyment of any of the good things of 
life is denied to us, not only by our own mortality, but more generally by the 
chronic instability and violence of the sensible world. Plato's vision in his 
middle-period dialogues is of a way of life which could secure for us, in spite 
of these hazards, a happiness that would be independent of all contingency. 
His proposal is that we learn, however slowly and arduously, to substitute 
for the natural objects of desire - physical pleasures and comforts, social 
recognition, even the companionship of loved persons - a different range of 
objects which can come to be of interest to us only on the basis of a higher 
culture (paideia); and the incentive he offers us for undertaking that culture 
is simply an assurance that these different objects, once attained, can never 
be taken · away from us, since they are naturally indestructible and 
incapable of being competed for. The objects in question are, of course, the 
Platonic Forms. So, once again, it is only the philosopher - the person who 
practises 'care of the psuchê' in the Socratic sense - who can hope genuinely 
to satisfy the desire expressed in our common feeling for 'beauty'. Other 
people - those who settle for the unreliable gratifications of life in the body -
thereby signify their acceptance of an inferior or counterfeit beauty, loaded 
with human flesh and colour and a mass of other mortal dross' (Symp. 
2 i i e ) . 
2 Recollection 
How did Plato think contact with the Forms was to be achieved? 
Before tackling this question directly, it may be helpful to look more closely 
at his 'intelligible realm', and at the theoretical role he envisaged for the 
objects belonging to it. Broadly speaking, the role of the Forms in Platonism 
is to shed light on certain problematic intellectual capacities of h u m a n 
beings. There is, first, the capacity to attach linguistic signs not just to 
particular objects presented in sense-experience ('Socrates', 'Plato') but also 
to concepts ('red', 'truthful', 'animal'), which can be instantiated by 
indefinitely many particulars but are never presented to us all at once, as 
particulars are. In this connection the theory of Forms is an attempt to 
explain, as regards sentences like 'Xanthippe is a woman', what it is that the 
expression 'a woman' stands for: in present-day terms, it is something like a 
theory of meaning for predicate-expressions. But, secondly, there is the 
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capacity of thought to reach beyond experience in a more radical sense -
that is, to draw comparisons between something encountered in exper-
ience, and on the other hand something which is not so encountered but 
which we somehow represent to ourselves. Plato asks himself: how is it 
possible for us to entertain propositions such as 'The perfectly just society 
has never yet been realised'? How can we think or talk about this thing, the 
perfectly just society, when by our own admission no one has ever had any 
experience of it? This seems to go against the intuition, still defended by 
modern philosophers of language, that you are not in a position to make a 
judgement (i.e. to have a thought) about something unless you have some 
knowledge that enables you to identify it - to single it out from everything 
else.'' 
Plato's famous doctrine of 'recollection' serves to explain how the human 
mind can gain access to the intelligible (or ideal) world, and consequently 
how ideal objects can come to figure in our judgements, ft is a doctrine 
which draws inspiration from the religious belief, shared in Plato's time by 
groups as dissimilar as the Pythagorean philosophers and the adherents of 
popular mystical cults, that psuchê is immortal and that it is reincarnated in 
a succession of different bodies. This belief seems to have worked more 
powerfully on Plato himself than on the historical Socrates, for in the early 
Apology (40c) Socrates is made to say that death is either a state of 
nothingness or a migration of the soul to another world; whereas in the 
mature dialogues this agnostic note is dropped and we find him speaking 
quite casually, yet with perfect conviction, about the next life.7 
The recollection doctrine as we first encounter it in the Meno is not 
explicitly presented as an adjunct to the theory of Forms, for that is still in 
embryo. At this stage, Plato's aim is a relatively modest one: he is concerned 
to explain the phenomenon of non-empirical learning or discovery, and by 
rendering this phenomenon intelligible, to confute sceptical doubts about 
the possibility of the Socratic enquiry into essences. (The doubts in question 
are those captured by the so-called 'paradox of enquiry': how, asks Meno 
(8od), can you set about looking for 8 an object that is unknown to you? 
After all, if you really don't know it, what do you suppose you are going to 
look for? And how will you recognise it when you find it?) 
Plato chooses as an illustration of such discovery the introduction of one 
of Meno's slave-boys to a geometrical theorem by a process of goal-oriented 
question and answer - a process which, we are pointedly told, is not one of 
* See Evans [623], S y fi*. 
7
 E.g. Rep. 498d: we must press on with our argument even in the face of apparent 
deadlock, since the reincarnated soul of Thrasymachus may be more receptive to 
arguments it has heard before. 
" Zitein. here used quasi-metaphorically of an intellectual search. 
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teaching but of recovery of knowledge by the boy from within himself (85a); that 
is. of remembering something which he once knew but has forgotten. This is 
Plato's way of representing the fact that what the boy learns is derived not 
from an 'external' source in sense-perception - it is not by looking at a 
diagram, however closely, that you grasp the ratio of the hypotenuse of an 
isosceles triangle to the other two sides - but from the perception of logical 
relationships between propositions. Anyone who speaks Greek (82b4), and 
so possesses the necessary vocabulary to enter into a discussion with 
Socrates about squares, triangles, etc., is already equipped with a stock of 
knowledge which - limited as it may appear -~ is in principle capable of being 
extended without limit by reflection on the meanings of the terms it 
comprises. Or rather, it is capable of being extended to the ideal limit 
represented by the complete a priori science that Plato envisages in Republic. 
vu, A promise that this goal is not unattainable is contained in the 
picturesque statement at Meno 8 id that 'all nature [or reality, physis] being 
akin, and the psuchê having learned everything, there is no reason why a 
person who has remembered (or, as they say, "learned") one single thing 
should not find out all the rest for himself. 
Why does Plato think that, in order to demonstrate the possibility of a 
universal science of conceptual connections, he has to persuade us that the 
psuchê really never lacks the knowledge that will be placed at its disposal by 
the dialectical process? From one point of view, this can be seen simply as a 
consequence of the Platonic axiom that 'nothing imperfect is the measure of 
anything' [Rep. VI.504C). Plato's use of the term 'recollection' (anamnesis) to 
characterise the process of a priori discovery, and so to dispel the 'paradox of 
enquiry', really displays his sympathy with the unspoken presupposition of 
the paradox, which is that knowledge must be complete knowledge if it is to 
be genuinely worthy of the name. To the question: 'How can one search for 
an unknown (intelligible) object?', Plato's reply is that in a sense the objects 
of philosophical enquiry are already as familiar to us as any of the other 
constituents of our world: that is to say, they are objects which have at some 
time been present to the psuchê, and which the-psnene" will therefore recognise 
if they are ever presented to it again. What makes the search necessary in 
the first place is that this knowledge is not operative, but latent, or dormant,9 
and so needs to be reactivated before we can claim to be in practical 
possession of it; but what is latent in the psuchê is nothing less than a 
memory of seeing the intelligible objects - of having them paraded before the 
mind's eye, as in the subsequent Phaedrus myth.1 0 
* This distinction was to become still more prominent in the moral psychology of 
Aristotle (cf. Nlcomachean Ethics vii.3). 
10
 Phaedrus 247c ff It is open to question how far Plato's overall contribution to 
epistemologa' is influenced by this flight ol fancy M F. Burnyeat, for example, has 
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A passage from the Phaedo account of recollection displays clearly the 
influence of this idea on Plato's reasoning. Here the immediate aim is to 
prove that the soul exists before its incarnation in the body, and the key 
consideration will be our ability to compare items encountered in exper-
ience with a non-empirical paradigm - as when we say that no two physical 
objects, considered in terms of length, weight, volume, etc., ever perfectly 
exemplify the mathematical concept of equality. (Plato treats this ability as 
powerful if not decisive evidence for pre-existence, since in his view the latter 
offers the only satisfactory explanation of it.) It is first agreed (73c 1-2) that 
in order to remember something, one must have known it before. Then 
Socrates asks (73C6 ff.): 'If, on seeing, hearing, or otherwise perceiving 
something, one not only apprehends that thing but comes to think of 
something else - something which is the object not of the same knowledge 
but of another - isn't it correct to say that one has remembered the thing of 
which one has acquired the thought?" The essence of this suggestion, which 
is explained in the next few pages of the Phaedo first with reference to a 
material 'something else' (a person) and then with reference to an intelli-
gible one ('the equal itself or absolute equality, 74C4-5), is that ' i /A makes 
you think ofB, then Β must be someone, or something, you have already met. The 
possibility that you might advance from A to Β by a non-arbitrary process of 
projection or extrapolation (rather than returning to Β as to the scene of a 
past experience) is simply ignored. 
But perhaps this nostalgia for a putative perfect knowledge is motivated, 
in turn, by the quasi-spatial conception of an intelligible 'realm' (noëtos 
topos) which we noticed earlier. For it is only if we imagine the totality of 
possible applications of a concept laid out in space, and hence as survey able 
at a single moment (if only the viewer could get into the right position), that 
we shall think of concepts or 'ideas' as the sort ofthing that could be grasped 
by a disembodied mind. If, by contrast, we picture the meaning of an 
expression as making itself known to us not through some favourable 
configuration of objects but through the unfolding of events over time, it 
becomes possible to give a different account of the phenomenon that 
interests Plato - that is, of our ability to advance from a more superficial to a 
condemned the view that 'something analogous to perceptual acquaintance Is for 
Plato . . . a requirement of knowledge quite generally', or that he '[confuses] 
propositional knowledge with something called "knowledge by acquaintance"' 
([182]), 183; the allusion is to Bertrand Russell's terminology in The Problems of 
Philosophy [657], ch. 5. 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by 
Description'). Interestingly, though, the general claim has suggested itself to at 
least one commentator Independently of Russell's categories: 'For [Plato] truly (as 
he supposed the highest sort of knowledge must of necessity be) all knowledge 
was like knowing a person', enthuses Walter Pater ([644]. 116). 
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deeper understanding of the concepts we use. This different account would 
insist that our embodied condition is not one of exile from a truth located 
elsewhere, but rather a horizon which encloses any possible progression 
from (relative) ignorance to (relative) knowledge. It would maintain, with 
Plato,11 that the starting-point for theory (i.e. for making the meanings of 
our terms fully explicit) is the rudimentary understanding of abstractions 
such as 'knowledge', 'beauty', 'justice', etc. which we possess from the 
moment these words first find a place in our idiolect: but it would represent 
theoretical activity in general not as a retrieval of something already 
(innately) present in the mind, but as an exploration of the possibilities 
opened up by a common language. 
The remainder of the Phaedo aims to show that psuchê not only pre-exists 
our physical birth, but also survives our physical death, and indeed is 
immortal. (Appropriately, the dramatic setting of this dialogue is the prison 
cell in which Socrates is about to submit to the death penalty.) Two passages 
are particularly significant for. our purposes: first, a critique of the materia-
list view that psuchê is a 'harmony' or at tunement of bodily elements ('hot 
and cold, dry and wet, and so on': 86b8), and must therefore cease to exist as 
soon as the body ceases to live; and secondly, an attempted proof of the 
positive thesis that it is impossible in principle for the psuchê to die, since 'life' 
belongs to it as an essential characteristic, just as heat belongs to fire or 
oddness to the number three (102b ff.), 
These arguments are meant to provide a rational foundation for Plato's 
ruling moral idea - the idea of a 'philosophical' way of life devoted to the care 
of our true (immaterial) selves. Both, however, are flawed. The first rests on 
an objection to the 'harmony' theory which is nowhere near as decisive as 
Plato seems to have believed. According to this objection, the theory 
contradicts itself on the question of whether or not one psuchê can be more 
'attuned' - i.e. can be more or less of a harmony - than another. From one 
point of view we are forced to conclude that it cannot (since being α psuchê. is 
not a matter of degree); from another, on the contrary, that it can (since the 
theory also represents personal virtue in terms of 'attunement ' - 93c - and 
individuals obviously differ in this respect). But it is far from clear why the 
materialist could not dispose of this objection by distinguishing two senses of 
'at tunement ' , one of which would admit of degree and one not. This would 
be no more than a development of the musical metaphor from which the 
theory was launched: for example, every lyre (once fitted with strings) will 
make some sort of noise, and is thus 'attuned' in one way or another, but it is 
" Plato's Socrates relies on his interlocutors, however naive or confused, to tell him 
what they think From what other source could the dialectical method derive 
materials on which to work? 
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only when a lyre is ready to be played that it can be said to be 'attuned' in the 
normative sense, i.e. to be in tune. Granted this distinction, we could surely 
characterise not only the soul's virtue, but 'soul' itself, as an 'at tunement ' 
(i.e. as a configuration or structural property) of matter rather than, as Plato 
would have it, a substance with properties of its own. ; 
Again, the Phaedo's final argument for immortality suffers fatally from the 
assumption that among a thing's essential properties may be that of 
existence itself. Plato believes that some things necessarily exist, namely 
those things which possess essentially the property of being alive: in 
addition to the psuchê, these include (i) God and (ii) the Form of life, 1 o 6 d s -
6. The notion of a necessarily existent being was to have an enduring 
influence, reappearing in the rational theology of the Middle Ages in the 
guise of an 'ontological argument ' for the existence of God; whatever its 
merit in that connect ion," its inadequacy to the task of proving personal 
immortality emerges as soon as we recall that essential properties were 
introduced as those which a thing cannot cease to have without ceasing to 
exist (cf. 103C5). The information that one's psuchê is 'essentially alive' in 
this sense does little towards robbing bpdily death of its sting. 
3 Division and harmony 
We must take care to distinguish the main 'harmony' doctrine 
criticised in the Phaedo, which seeks to reduce psuchê to a physiological 
structure, from the different idea that the psuchê in individual persons may 
be in a condition of harmony or disharmony and that this condition 
determines its moral quality. (The latter is the idea which appears in a 
subordinate role in the Phaedo discussion.) Plato was not, it seems, the first 
to speak of the mind in musical t e rms , " but the metaphor of 'psychic 
harmony' is one of the most influential with him, recurring in ethical 
contexts throughout his career. No doubt it gained in suggestiveness from 
the semantic range of the Greek word mousikê, which was much wider than 
that of our 'music', denoting as it did the whole of the literary and artistic 
side of life. At all events, this metaphor suggested to Plato an increasingly 
complex and articulate conception of the ideal to be pursued both in conduct 
and - still more important - in regard to one's mental state. 
On the inward side, 'psychic harmony' refers in the first instance to a 
requirement of the Socratic method - the avoidance of contradiction in 
one's judgements. So, for example, if Callicles in the Gorgias fails to explore 
the logical consequences of his immoralist views (which Socrates believes to 
" For a sympathetic reconstruction of the argument in secular terms, see 
Collingwood [615], 124fr. 
1J
 See Dodds [117], 260. 
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be incoherent), he is doomed to remain in a condition of internal 'discord': 
'Callicles will not agree with you, Ο Callicles, but will be at variance with 
you (diaphônêsei) all your life' (482b5-6) . But intellectual and moral goals 
are never sharply differentiated in Plato, and from the outset the metaphor 
of 'harmony' invokes the further, more overtly edifying, idea of a proper 
ordering of parts within the psuchê. This spiritual order or structure, in 
Plato's view, reflects (for better or worse, depending on political conditions) 
the order prevailing in the society to which one belongs; and ideally, it 
reflects also the grand, unchanging order of the universe as a whole, though 
this correspondence is distorted in most people by the union of soul with 
body (see Timaeus (Tim.) 44ab).1 4 
Now it is only when perfect order is realised in an individual psuche that 
the person concerned can be said to qualify, by Platonic standards, as a truly 
h u m a n being - a legitimate example of human nature. Plato's psychology 
shares in the idealism of his conception of truth and reality in general, 
according to which it is only a perfect χ which can be described (strictly 
speaking, or without qualification) as a real χ at all; imperfect specimens are 
regarded as partially successful copies or adumbrations of-the real thing. We 
must therefore bear in mind that the state of 'psychic harmony* - although 
it is, precisely, a perfect state, not within the reach of mediocre people but 
only of rare heroic figures such as Socrates - nevertheless functions in 
Platonism as a fixed point by reference to which we can find out what a 
h u m a n being really is; and so, w h a t we ourselves really are, behind the 
misleading façade of our apparent nature. It follows that the pursuit of 
psychic harmony is not a 'mere' moral ideal, such as Anglo-Saxon 
philosophy is apt to contrast unfavourably with more modest (and hence 
more practicable) rules of life. On the contrary, it is an attempt to realise 
ourselves, or to become (in actuality) what we already (potentially) are;15 
and this is something which it could not fail to be in our interest to do, since 
actualising our potential means coming to be as fully alive as is possible for 
the kind of creatures we are, and our own (active) life is something of which 
we can never have too much, 
14
 Plato is thus the originator of the idea of 'man as microcosm', i.e. of the 
individual human mind as a complete world in miniature, reproducing the 
structural features of a wider world beyond; the actual words 'microcosm' and 
macrocosm' were not. however, coined by him but by his commentators in the 
Christian era. 
' * This idea, which takes on an architectonic significance in Aristotle, remains 
irresistible even to Nietzsche: see The Gay Science, section 270: 'What does thy 
conscience say? "Thou shall become the one thou art.'" (Notice, however, that 
Nietzsche is thinking of one's individual nature, not one's nature as a member of 
the species.) 
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What then are the constituents of the Platonic psuche the terms which 
nay or may not be so related as to confer internal harmony' on the whole? 
At first Plato did not even think of the mind as composite. In fact, its non-
:omposite nature is cited in the Phaedo ( 78b ff. ) as a reason for believing it to 
je indestructible, though the case for regarding it as non-composite rests on 
:onsiderations which could scarcely have carried much weight outside the 
Socratic circle (the psuchê is 'more similar' in character to the invisible world 
)f Ideas than to the visible world of bodies, and as such is 'likely' to be among 
he things which have no parts: 78C7, 79b4). But he had strong 
-notives for amending this view in the slightly later Republic, where the 
ysuche is said to contain three distinct elements: reason (to logistikon, literally 
'the rational'), 'spirit' or 'passion' (to thûmoeides), and appetite (ίο 
epithumêtikon). 
Foremost among these was the motive generated by the political argu-
ment of the Republic. According to this argument, a political society is in 
essence a single, intelligent (and hence purposive) being, but a being whose 
intelligence is not equally distributed among the individual persons who 
make it up. Plato wishes to represent the polis as endowed with thought 
(unlike the purely biological communities of ants, bees, etc.), but at the same 
time his contempt for the democratic form of government leads him to treat 
(independent) thinking as a specialised function and to assign it to a specific 
social class, membership of which is to be open only to an intellectual elite 
(the 'natural leaders': see Rep. 474CI-3) . In this way he arrives at the idea of 
a rational organism - a thinking subject composed of parts whose relation to 
the whole would be the same as that of individual organs to the body. The 
relationship Plato has in mind is that of contributing to the well-being of the 
whole in whatever way one's natural gifts allow, and in the political sphere he 
distinguishes not more than three such ways:16 these correspond respec-
tively to the functions of philosopher-guardians, military guardians, and the 
'third class', which includes all manual labourers and traders. 
Now the chief aim of the Republic is to determine the nature of justice, 
which is, of course, an intelligible Form or Idea; and when we speak of 
'Form'. Plato reminds us (Rep. 4 3 535-7) , we are speaking of something that 
is one and the same wherever it appears, so that any two particulars which 
instantiate a given form will be in that respect identical (as, for example, in 
the case of two triangles which have all the same mathematical properties). 
This methodological principle implies that if there is more than one context 
in which (as we would put it) a particular concept is used, then any proposed 
philosophical account of that concept will have to be tested for correctness 
'* I mean, no more than three at the level of abstraction relevant to political theory; 
there are, of course, indefinitely many specialised functions within the third class. 
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and completeness in all these contexts successively; or, better, any account 
developed in one context will have to be corrected by means of insights 
drawn from another. Here only two contexts - city and soul - are involved, 
and Plato envisages an indefinite series of transitions from one to the other, 
with the true logos finally appearing as a flash of illumination like a spark 
from two sticks rubbed together (434d-43 5a). (This illustrates one aspect of 
the meaning of 'dialectic': truth emerges from the exchange between two 
parties in à conversation, dialogos.) 
The doctrine of the tripartite soul is so important, not only within 
Platonism but for the whole subsequent European tradition of moral and 
psychological theory, that we had better take time to inspect its foundations. 
Obviously, begins Socrates (435e), the properties we attribute to whole 
communities must also be present in their individual members. (How could 
Thrace be spirited, Athens intellectual, Egypt commercial, etc., if not 
because that is how the inhabitants of those places tend to be?) The question 
is whether the entire soul is operative in each of these sorts of activity, or 
whether 'we learn with one part, feel indignation with another, and desire 
food, procreation, and so on with a third' ( 4 3 6 a 9 - b i : notice that Plato 
never contemplates more than three distinct psychic tendencies). Socrates 
now introduces a theoretical principle which should be helpful: nothing can 
act or be acted upon in opposite ways at the same time, unless we make 
some qualification, e.g. by distinguishing parts of the thing, or different 
respects or relations in which the action or passion might occur (436b8-9) . 
For instance, we might be tempted to say that a person or a spinning top was 
both moving and resting at the same time - but the conflict disappears if we 
specify what part of the person we mean in each case (e.g. standing on one 
spot but moving the hands), or in what respect there is movement or rest 
(e.g. the top is stationary in respect of its axis, revolving in respect of its outer 
edge, 436de). Let us call this the 'principle of opposition'. 
Now, desire and aversion are opposed states of mind which we sometimes 
experience simultaneously in relation to the same object: for instance, you 
may feel thirsty but resist the temptation to drink for reasons of health 
(439c). Socrates takes care to explain that we must not interpret his 
favourite doctrine that everyone desires the good to mean that there is no such 
phenomenon in our mental life as an attraction towards objects which are 
in fact bad. That doctrine refers to what we might call fully human desire, 
following the image of reason as the human element in the soul (58 8d), or in 
other words to desire informed by the activity of the logistikon (the sort that 
Aristotle will later call boulêsis or 'rational wish'). What we need to 
remember for present purposes, however, is that there are some motives (for 
instance thirst) which do not represent to themselves in any particular way 
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the satisfaction at which they aim, but are just animal drives (see 4 39b 4 -
5);!7 and that in a language-using creature, these drives co-exist with 
motives of a different kind which go hand in hand with the power of 
representing or describing possible courses of action in terms of some positive 
or negative value-concept ('it would be an honourable thing to do', 'it would 
be harmful to my health'). The acquisition of language, and thereby of a 
range of socially informed (or 'rational') desires, does not actually abolish 
physical desire: instead it subjects the body (more or less effectively in any 
individual case) to the command of a central government, leaving the 
individual potentially responsive to both representational and non-repre-
sentational motives (for instance, the thought that 1 had better not drink may 
co-exist with the desire to do so, though in a well-regulated mind the former 
will prevail). 
But now, recalling our 'principle of opposition', we can see that for Plato it 
will not do simply to attribute these conflicting impulses to 'the person' 
(viewed as a unit). For in his terms, to say of a single agent that he or she is 
disposed both to drink and to refrain from drinking (or more generally, both 
to pursue and to avoid a given object: cf..Catullus' odi et"amo) is to formulate 
an intellectual puzzle which demands to be resolved by a redescription of the 
case. Such phenomena (Plato thinks) illustrate the general principle that 
particular objects and actions, as they strike us now this way and now that, 
prompt us to apply to them first one predicate and then another directly 
opposed to it (see Rep. 476a , 523c ff.). The resulting instability in our 
representation of reality is a legitimate ground for mental discomfort: it 
needs to be eliminated by specifying in what respect, or in relation to what, 
each of the opposed predicates applies to the object. In the psychological 
case, the specification is carried out by postulating as many 'springs of 
action' in the psuchê as there are types of impulse which can enter into 
mutual conflict. We can then restore stability to our account of the conflict-
ridden psuche by saying that it desires to drink in respect of one of these 
springs of action, but desires to refrain from drinking in respect of another: 
according to Plato's construction, the former desire originates in an 
irrational, appetitive part ('the friend of certain satisfactions and pleasures', 
439d8), the latter from a reasoning element. 
The question next arises (439e) whether thumos ('spirit') should be 
regarded as a third, distinct, part of the soul or whether it should be 
identified with one of the other two. The immediate inclination of Glaucon, 
1
 ' 'So if ever anything draws [the soul of a thirsty person] in a contrary direction 
[sc, away from drinking], this will be something in the soul other than that 
which thirsts and which draws him like a wild animal towards drinking?' 
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Socrates' interlocutor, perhaps deferring to that usage of thumos in which it 
corresponds to the English word 'passion',18 is to equate this part with 
appetite (es). But this is discredited by the phenomenon of passionate self-
reproach or self-disgust, prompted by shameful impulses. In fact, thumos in 
general seems to be more closely associated with reason than with appetite, 
since this kind of indignation against oneself typically occurs when one is 
conscious of having acted contrary to one's own understanding of moral 
requirements; or again when one believes oneself to have been wronged by 
another person (440bd). Plato, then, thinks of thumos as the representative 
of impersonal moral consciousness within the soul at the level of 'right 
opinion' (as distinct from full knowledge): it is the kind of moral motivation 
established in us by early training (hence before the advent of reason in our 
lives), but calculated to make us receptive to the voice of reason when the 
time comes (cf. 402a) . Its non-identity with our reasoning faculty is shown 
simply by the fact that animals and children, as well as many adults, have 
the one (thumos) without the other (441 ab). 
With this last step the structural correspondence between city and soul is 
fully developed (C4-7), the 'spirited part ' having been duly portrayed as a 
psychic standing army - an intermediary between the 'better' and 'worse' 
elements, but always (in principle) in the service of the 'better'. The ideal 
psychic condition, which Socrates will shortly (443d) proceed to character-
ise in terms of the 'harmony' metaphor, is that reason - the smallest, but 
worthiest part - should rule in the soul with 'spirit' as its ally; and that both 
of these, united by physical and cultural education, should wield power over 
the psychic proletariat - the desiring element, which is 'the largest and . . . 
most insatiable part of each individual soul' (44286-7) . 
As we read this text we are witnessing the debut of a world-historic idea: 
that of the centred, or integrated, subject. This is the idea that every 
constituent of our subjectivity should be supervised and, as far as possible, 
controlled (though Plato is aware of the intractable nature of dreams: see 
Rep. 571c ff.) by a central agency which is representative of the self as a 
whole - like the philosopher-guardians vis-à-vis the city. The suggestive 
power of this image has persisted into modern times. Freudian psychoanaly-
sis, for example, has operated under the sign of a highly Platonic conception 
of sanity in so far as it has aimed at the 'replacement of id by ego' - i.e. at 
helping people escape from a condition in which their behaviour is 
dominated by impulses that are unconscious, and as such not controllable by 
that part of the mind which responds to external reality. To make this 
comparison is not to belittle Freud's invention, though it is true that 
'" Cf. Heraclitus, fr. 8s Diels, 'It is hard to fight against one's thumos: it will pay 
with its life for what it desires.' 
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nowadays, in the climate created by the revisionai)· psychoanalytic theory 
of J'acques Lacan, the notion of a split' or deecntred' (and therefore 
essentially unstable) subject is mounting a serious challenge to the auth-
ority of the Platonist ideal.1 ' 
As we have just seen, a psuche conforming to that ideal will be dis-
tinguished by a certain kind of internal constitution - literally an 'aristoc-
racy' in miniature, a régime under which the 'better' elements rule the 
'worse'. We have progressed, then, from the bare assumption that justice is a 
Form - an assumption dictated by the Socratic method - to a detailed 
account of what Form (or structure) an individual psuche must exhibit if it is 
to be credited with this fundamental virtue. But in fact Plato never ceases to 
draw inspiration from the more abstract, or primitive, idea of an opposition 
between form and formlessness in general, and of the psuche as a field upon 
which these rival principles fight it out.2" Already in the Gorgias (5043b) we 
find him comparing the psuche with other objects whose merit lies in the 
Order and proportion' imparted to them by a purposive intelligence (houses, 
ships, etc.); and in the Republic he develops this into a picture of the 
philosopher-ruler as' a 'psychic artist' - one whose dedication to the 
intelligible Forms will prompt him not only to imitate these in his own life, 
but also to reproduce them in the lives of other people 'both privately and 
publicly' (50od5), taking as his raw material politically formless humanity. 
The consequences of this picture in relation to more familiar forms of art' 
are notorious. Republic χ examines the activities we are accustomed to think 
of as 'imitating reality' (drama, poetry, painting, etc.) and argues that they 
do not deserve to be recognised as anything more than imitators of 
appearance. As such, they pose a threat to psychic order, for they are allies 
of an 'inferior' part of the mind ( 6 0 3 b ! , 6 0 5 h l ) - o f something in us which 
positively relishes the violent and contradictory qualities of h u m a n emo­
tion, or the variety of aspects of a visible object, or the element of play or 
tinkering with expressive materials which is common to all the arts. For 
Plato, the presentation of a thought-content in a pleasurable form is always 
dangerous, since it threatens to distract us from the real question, which is 
the truth-value of the content (just as we can be led astray in our search for 
true beauty in h u m a n beings by the facile charms of youth and health: 
6oib6~7; cf. 4 0 2 - 3 ) . At this high point in the development of his 
psychology, the 'enemy within' is represented above all by a hankering after 
" For the comparison with Freud, see Kenny [167], section πι. 
'<· The Pythagorean Table of Opposites' cited by Aristotle (Mel. A.5: 98f>a22 ff.) has 
'limit' and 'unlimited' (peras and apeiron) as the first of its ten pairs of opposed 
terms; so this feature of Plato's philosophy again lends support to Aristotle's 
description of him as 'in most respects a follower of the Pythagoreans' (Met. A.6: 
987330). 
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spectacle, diversity or unstructured plenitude: and his fierce resistance to 
temptation from that quarter leaves its mark both on the epistemology and 
on the moral theory of the Republic. Epistemically. the goal proposed there is 
to exchange the multiplicity of appearances, or 'seeming' - of the quasi-
cognitive states that crowd in upon us unbidden, as things strike us in this 
way or that - for the unity of'being' as registered in an achieved, and stable, 
structure of belief; morally, it is to exchange the multiplicity of transient 
emotion (pathos) for the unity of an achieved, and stable, soul-structure, 
The slightly later Phaedrus,11 whose joint themes are love and rhetoric, is 
our source for another celebrated statement of the tripartition doctrine. 
Here Plato likens the psuche to a chariot drawn by a pair of winged horses 
(246a): the latter, which are of unequal character, correspond respectively 
to 'spirit' and appetite, and the driver to the faculty of reason which directs 
both. This dialogue inherits from the Republic a vision of the defeat of unruly 
desire by the 'better', truth-seeking, self; and a conception of philosophy as 
the authentic psuchagògia, or 'mind-guidance' (26 ia8 ) , of which rhetoric 
(in the popular sense of the word) is a mere travesty. So, once again, the 
scene is set for a battle between true and false culture for the possession of 
individual souls - between the vulgar cult of plausibility and the critical 
study of our own system of meanings (265e). 
Yet the Phaedrus changes the balance of emphasis within Plato's psycho-
logical theory: over against the somewhat austere ideal of psychic integ-
ration, it boldly affirms the role of unreason in our life, and even claims that 
our greatest gifts are the fruit of madness, provided the madness be god-
given' (244a6-8) . Retrieving from the Symposium his doctrine of the 
education of desire, Plato now acknowledges sexual love, along with poetic 
and prophetic enthusiasm, as a species of divine mania - in other words, as a 
non-rational mode of access to 'what is h igher ' . " For he tells us that in the 
grip of erotic mania, certain privileged souls - those with an aptitude for 
recollection of the world of Forms which we inhabited before birth (250e -
2 5 1 a ) - regain the 'wings' which will lift them, through speculation, from 
the material to the ideal. This dialogue, then, brings into prominence a 
theme which was relatively understated in the Republic: that of the 
grounding of our discursive powers in a non-discursive source of energy, 
namely the compulsion to make contact with (or to reappropriate) alienated 
constituents of our own being. In the attempt to characterise this compul-
" This is the consensual view which has emerged from scholarly debate about the 
date of the dialogue. For a review of the arguments (and further references), see 
Hackforth [156], Introduction; Nussbaum [32], 47η, η. s· 
1 1
 Cf. Wittgenstein [671], 6.432. 
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sion, Plato takes as his paradigm our experience of the sexual wish to 
appropriate an object perceived simultaneously as 'other' and as 
'non-other'. " 
4 An ambiguous humanity 
We interpreted the idea of the tripartite psuchê in the first instance 
as a correction to Plato's earlier dualist account of the mind-body relation. 
The suggestion was that he withdrew in the Republic the cruder theory of the 
Phaedo, which attributed appetite exclusively to the body and represented 
the life of reason, by contrast, as an ascetic 'rehearsal for death' (66b ff.: 
6765). Now, there is a rough and ready truth in this. Plato never reverts to 
the view that physical sensations belong to the body rather than to the mind: 
the Theaetetus ( i84d) assigns to a unitary psuchê the task of synthesising 
information received through the various senses, while the Pliilebus, one of 
his last works, argues that thirst and the like belong not to the body but to 
the psuche, in virtue of the letter's memory of past gratification (35er]). Plato 
seems, too, to have felt retrospectively a falsity of emphasis in the Phaedo's 
portrayal of bodily existence per se as an obstacle to wisdom and virtue: the 
Republic swings so far the other way as to present its ethical programme as 
positively one of hedonism, albeit in a strictly ideal sense (586de: under the 
rule of reason each part of the soul will enjoy 'the truest pleasures of which it 
is capable'), 
It would be wrong, however, to give the impression that Plato ever simply 
abandons dualism in favour of the more naturalistic view that the life of the 
mind necessarily comprises bodily as well as non-bodily elements. On the 
contrary, he remains strongly committed to the view that the rational 
element in us is the real self, and that it is this real self which survives our 
physical death. In fact, it is difficult to give a categorical answer to the 
question of Plato's final position on the anatomy of the soul, except to say 
that it is a position within which his 'worldly' psychology pulls in one 
direction, while his religious and transcendental concerns pull in another. 
The Republic shows clear signs of internal tension on this score. For its 
final book introduces new grounds for the belief that the soul is indestruct-
ible, and consequently that it must after all be non-composite. Nothing can 
be destroyed, argues Socrates, except by its own 'native evil' or disease 
(609a), yet the 'psychic disease' of injustice identified in book iv has no 
2
 ' Cf. the description of recollection as a 'recovery of knowledge which is our own 
(oikeian)', Phaedo 75e (with Burnet's note). Nussbaum ([32], ch. 7) argues that 
the Phaedrus represents, not just a change of emphasis, but an actual change of 
doctrine as compared with the Republic - a revaluation of 'the risky and the 
mutable' inspired by Plato's personal experience. 
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tendency to bring about the dissolution of the composite human creature - a 
vicious soul is, if anything, restless and hyperactive rather than the reverse. 
And in fact it would be against reason for the soul to be able to die of its vices, 
because this would enable vicious people to put themselves out of their 
misery by sheer perseverance. 2 4 On a deeper view, then, we find that the 
'lower' parts of the soul do not after all belong to it essentially, but are like the 
underwater accretions of the sea-god Glaucus - mere trappings of the true 
soul, the logistikon, which cling to it in its present earthly.state (61 id) . 
What looks at first glance like an outright self-contradiction (the sou] 
both is, and is not, composed of parts) can be mitigated - though not 
resolved by setting it against the appropriate idealist background. The 
'parts' in question, we must remember, are not fellow-citizens in a psychic 
democracy: the}' stand in an immutable order of rank, and it is the best 
element in us - the best expression of our nature - which provides the key to 
our identity, just as it is a perfect circle which tells us what we need to know-
in order to define circularity. Plato's conception of humanity as an amalgam 
of what is truly human with other, extraneous factors is captured in all its-
incoherence by .his comparison of the psuche to one of those fantastic beasts 
of mythology (Rep. 588b ff.) - in this case, a combination of man, lion and 
'many-headed monster' (representing, of course, our old friends reason, 
spirit and appetite). This image is bound to prompt the question: how could 
it be a mark of human nature to be less than fully h u m a n , and so to be less 
than itself? 
A legitimate, if enigmatic, answer to this question would be that human 
nature according to Plato is inevitably 'less than itself just because it is also 
more than itself. Not content to have described an ideal political system in 
which mind (or theory) would take precedence over matter (or physical 
labour) and issue commands to it as master to slave,2 5 he goes on to 
extrapolate these values into an all-embracing doctrine of cosmic order, 
setting up psuche as a metaphysical principle in authority over soma or 
'body'. For psuche (he argues in the Phaedrus, 245c ff.; and at greater length 
in Laws x, 891e ff.) is the only sort of entity which can initiate m o v e m e n t - i n 
contrast to matter, which moves only when motion is imparted to it by some 
external agency; it is therefore prior to matter in the sense that, given a 
perfectly static universe, spontaneous motion would necessarily precede the 
2 4
 Glaucon's words at 61 ode hint at an interesting supplement to the Phaedo 
arguments for immortality. An after-life is necessary, Plato now suggests, in 
order that the wicked may suffer for their sins: therefore it exists, assuming the 
universe to be rational. This seems to prefigure the Kantian doctrine of 
immortality as a postulate of pure practical reason. See Adam [161], vol. π ad loc. 
" For an illuminating study of the organising role within Platonism of thTs 'master-
slave' motif, see Vlastos [179]. 
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mechanically transmitted variety if things were to get moving at all. As 
such, psuchê is the 'natural master', while matter is the 'natural subject' 
(Laws 896C2-3). 
The foregoing bit of reasoning not unnaturally determines Plato's 
conception of that most 'masterful' of all beings - the deity, or living 
presence which ensures the orderly movement of the universe in its totality. 
It is only fitting that the Platonic God should consist of 'a soul or souls' 
(89905), and should be said to have created the immortal component of the 
human psuche in its own likeness (Tim. 41c). But this of course implies that 
the process by which human beings 'become what they are' is at the same 
time a process of coming to resemble God - the being on whom the best 
element of human nature is modelled. And so it implies that to become 
truly human is to come to exemplify a nature which is more than human, 
namely that of unadulterated mind, or in other words of God. (Hence Plato 
can tell us at Rep. 501b that the 'likeness of true manhood' produced by the 
political artistry of the guardians will be derived from their understanding of 
the 'godlike' quality named hy Homer: he senses in this poetic term a naive 
anticipation of the philosQphical truth that humanity,· by virtue of its faculty 
of reason, is a creature 'not Of earth but of heaven', Tim. 90a.) If the essence 
of the human being is to transcend itself in the direction of the divine, then 
from another point of view it will belong just as much to our essence to be 
forever only en route to our humanity, not yet to have achieved it; and so to 
have to reach an accommodation, during our earthly existence, with 
components of our own mentality which are Incidental (and inferior) to our 
presumed 'true selves'. 
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